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Abstract
We study a continuous-time version of the intermediation model of Grossman and Miller [18].
To wit, we solve for the competitive equilibrium prices at which liquidity takers’ demands are
absorbed by dealers with quadratic inventory costs, who can in turn gradually transfer these
positions to an end-user market. This endogenously leads to a model with transient price impact.
Smooth, diffusive, and discrete trades all incur finite but nontrivial liquidity costs, and can arise
naturally from the liquidity takers’ optimization.
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1 Introduction
A basic paradigm of classical financial theory is that markets are “perfectly liquid”, in that arbitrary
amounts can be traded immediately at the quoted market price. Yet, in reality liquidity is limited
and generated by the interplay of strategic liquidity providers and consumers. Indeed, as succinctly
summarized by [6] in the context of foreign exchange markets:
“Dealers in over-the-counter financial markets provide liquidity to customers on a principal
basis and manage the risk position that arises out of this activity in one of two ways. They
may internalize a customers trade by warehousing the risk in anticipation of future offsetting
flow, or they can externalize the trade by hedging it out in the open market. [..] The notion
that dealers are either perfect internalizers or perfect externalizers is of course too constraining
and in practice they will use to varying extent a mix of both to manage their risk.”
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In the present study, we develop a dynamic equilibrium model for this kind of liquidity formation
by extending the classical intermediation model of Grossman and Miller [18] to continuous time.
To wit, we consider representative dealers, who intermediate between the demands of their clients
and a group of end-users.1 The clients trade to track an exogenous, stochastically evolving target
position as in [24, 31, 12] and are therefore willing to pay a premium for the immediacy the dealers
provide. The end-users have no intrinsic trading needs, but are willing to trade the asset under
consideration at its exogenous “fundamental value”.
With access to a perfectly liquid end-user market, competitive dealers would provide immediacy
at the fundamental price. Nontrivial liquidity costs arise in the natural situation when the client
order flow can only be passed on to the end-users gradually. We model this in a tractable manner
by a quadratic cost levied on the dealers’ transfer rate. This can be interpreted either as a reduced
form search cost, or as linear temporary price impact in the end-user market as in the optimal
execution literature [1].
When limited liquidity in the end-user market makes it impossible to offload accumulated
positions immediately, the dealers’ holding costs are reflected in the equilibrium prices at which
they absorb their clients’ demands. In order to permit the analysis of this complex interaction, we
assume that i) dealers act as price takers, ii) their holding costs are quadratic in the size of the
positions held, and iii) the fundamental price has martingale dynamics. As in Garleanu, Pedersen,
and Poteshman [14], the first assumption means that the equilibrium price is “competitive”, which
is reasonable if the representative dealers correspond to a large number of small liquidity providers,
whose individual actions cannot affect the overall market equilibrium.2 Quadratic holding costs
are also used in [30, 26, 28], for example, because this “inventory aversion” is considerably more
tractable than risk aversion, yet still penalizes the accumulation of large and thereby risky positions.
The martingale assumption on the fundamental price, also made in [18, 15], ensures that the dealers
focus on inventory management rather than speculative investment in the end-user market.
In this setting, our first main result identifies the unique equilibrium price at which the dealers
absorb a given client demand:
Equilibrium Price = Fundamental Price
+ Holding Cost× Expected Future Inventory.
This adjustment is consistent with the small-risk aversion limit obtained for the model of [14]
in [22, 21]. However, whereas the price impact is permanent in these models without end-users, it
becomes transient in our model. The reason is that the client order flow can be gradually passed on
to the end-user market here, so that the expected future demand in the formula of [21] is replaced
by the optimally controlled inventory above.3
By appealing to results on quadratic tracking problems [3], the dynamics of the optimally-
controlled inventory of the dealers can be computed explicitly in terms of the past, present, and
(suitably discounted expectations of) the future client order flow. The comparative statics of these
1Unlike the “market makers” in [19, 23] and many more recent studies, these liquidity providers are not obliged
to absorb any order flow, but trade at their discretion. Investment banks providing liquidity in foreign exchange
markets are a typical example, compare [6].
2Evidently, a very important but challenging direction for further research is to study extensions to a game-
theoretic setting, where dealers dynamically adjust their price quotes to account for their inventories while competing
with each other for the clients’ order flow. For liquidation problems, a first step in this direction is undertaken in [7],
where dealers strategically quote bid-ask spreads for randomly arriving clients with exogenous demand curves, and a
strategic client who needs to liquidate a large position.
3Put differently, the dealers in [14, 21, 22] correspond to “pure internalisers” in the terminology of [6], whereas
our dealers employ both internalisation and externalisation in an optimal manner.
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explicit but rather intricate dynamics can be better understood for highly-liquid end-user markets.
In this regime, the dealers’ inventories can be kept small, so that the equilibrium price in the client
market closely tracks the asset’s fundamental value. The clients’ liquidity costs compared to the
corresponding frictionless wealth processes in turn admit simple, intuitive expressions that depend
on the fluctuations of the client demand.
If the latter is smooth, trading through the dealer market is approximately equivalent to trading
directly in the end-user market at twice the cost. This higher friction reflects the premium that
is necessary to entice the dealers to provide the necessary liquidity. Since smooth client flow
can he hedged rather efficiently by trading in the end-user market, the dealers’ holding costs do
not appear in the leading-order term in this regime. This changes for diffusive client demands.
Such more irregular order flow is much more difficult to pass on to the illiquid end-user market.
Accordingly, the corresponding liquidity costs asymptotically scale with the square root of the
trading cost in the end-user market, multiplied by the square root of the dealers’ holding cost.
The order flow at hand enters through its quadratic variation, similarly as in the reduced form
model of [11]. Here, however, the trading costs of such “rough” strategies cannot be avoided as in
[11, 2] by approximating it with smooth strategies. More generally, the liquidity costs implied by
our model are continuous in the client demand. As a consequence, strategies of different form are
priced consistently and incur finite but nontrivial liquidity costs.
The results described so far pertain to the case of a fixed given client demand as in [14]. However,
our model is tractable enough to also endogenize this order flow. To this end, we assume that the
(representative) clients also act as price takers and trade to track an exogenous target position. For
constant trading targets as in [12], this is similar to the optimal liquidation problems studied in
[5, 1, 29] and many more recent papers. Diffusive trading targets correspond to the “high-frequency
trading needs” considered in [24, 31].
Starting from an execution price corresponding to some fixed demand process, the clients’
optimization problem can readily be solved in closed form. In equilibrium, the optimal client
demand in turn has to coincide with the one used to generate the execution price. This leads
to an integral equation describing the clients’ optimal order flow. This integral equation can be
reformulated as a linear forward-back stochastic differential equation. We show that it admits a
unique explicit solution that can be described in closed form in a number of examples.
Indeed, for constant trading targets, the clients’ optimal trading strategies are of a similar form
as in optimal liquidation models with transient price impact [29]: isolated bulk trades combined
with otherwise smooth order flow. In contrast, diffusive trading targets as in [24, 31] lead to optimal
client demands with nontrivial quadratic variation. Therefore, our model consistently combines the
qualitative properties of standard models for optimal liquidation, while nevertheless allowing for
rapidly fluctuating inventories in line with the empirical evidence documented by [9].
In both of these examples, we can compare the clients’ liquidity costs when trading through
the dealers to the hypothetical costs they would incur if they could trade directly in the end-user
market. At the leading-order for high liquidity in the end user market, the respective liquidity costs
only differ by a universal function of the ratio of clients’ and dealers inventory costs. To wit, if the
dealers’ inventory costs are sufficiently low, then the additional risk-sharing capacity they provide
is more than worth the premium charged to clients in equilibrium. In contrast, dealers with small
risk-bearing capacities require large premia, so that clients would be better off by implementing
their trading strategies directly in the end-user market.
In the baseline version of our model, we consider price-taking clients, who do not internalize the
impact of their order flow on the execution price. While this is reasonable for “representative” clients
aggregating the demand of many small liquidity takers, this assumption is questionable for “large”
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clients that have to liquidate a substantial asset position, for example. In this case, it is natural to
study a variant of the above setup where clients internalize the dependence of the equilibrium price
on their demand. This amounts to a more involved optimization problem that, remarkably, turns
out to produce an equilibrium of exactly the same form. The only difference is that the clients’
inventory costs are halved in the corresponding formulas. This means that when internalizing their
price impact, clients weigh their inventory concerns less heavily and accordingly trade more slowly.
By correctly internalizing their price impact, large clients improve their performance compared to
the aggregate of small clients, and our model allows to quantify the magnitude of this “price of
anarchy” [8].
Notation Throughout, we fix a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) satisfying the usual
conditions. We say a predictable process X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] belongs to L 2 if E[
∫ T
0 X
2
t dt] < ∞ and
to S 2 if E[supt∈[0,T ]X2t ] < ∞. The set of square-integrable martingales is denoted by M 2, and
we write H 2 for the semimartingales whose local martingale part belongs to M 2 and whose finite-
variation part has square-integrable total variation.4
2 The Dealers’ Problem
2.1 A Dynamic Model for Intermediation
We consider dealers who intermediate between the demand of their clients for some financial asset,
and end-users with whom they can trade the asset at its “fundamental value”. In this section,
we suppose the clients’ demand is an exogenously given process K = (Kt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ S 2; it will be
endogenized in Section 3 below.
Clients trade with dealers at a competitive price SK to be determined in equilibrium by matching
the dealers’ supply K to the clients’ demand K. The dealers also have access to a group of end-users,
who are willing to trade the risky asset at its exogenous fundamental value V = (Vt)t∈[0,T ] ∈M 2.5
However, the end-user market is not perfectly liquid, so that the dealers can transfer the assets
only gradually to the end-users. We model this in a tractable manner by a quadratic cost levied
on the dealers’ layoff rate. This can be interpreted as a reduced-form search cost. Alternatively,
one can view this as a result of linear price impact in the end-user market as in the optimal
execution literature [1]. To wit, if dealers trade dUt units of the risky asset with the end-users over
the (infinitesimal) time interval [t, t + dt], then the trade is executed at the unit price Vt +
λ
2
dUt
dt .
Compared to the frictionless execution price, the dealers therefore incur costs λ2u
2
tdt quadratic in
the trading rate ut = dUt/dt. Accordingly, the dealers’ P&L from trading with the end-users
is
∫ T
0 UtdVt − λ2
∫ T
0 u
2
tdt for a given trading rate u = (ut)t∈[0,T ] and the corresponding positions
Ut =
∫ t
0 usds.
Apart from the transfers to the end-user market, the dealers also choose their supply (Kt)t∈[0,T ]
to clients. That is, they are not contractually obliged to absorb all client orders like traditional
“market makers” studied in [19], for example. Instead, as in [14], the dealers choose how much
liquidity they want to provide at each time, as is typical for modern foreign exchange markets, for
example.
4For an Itoˆ process with dynamics dXt = µtdt+ σdWt, this holds if E
[
(
∫ T
0
|µt|dt)2 +
∫ T
0
σ2t dt
]
<∞.
5As in [18, 15], we assume that the fundamental value has martingale dynamics, so that the dealers only engage
in intermediation rather than speculative investment.
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holding costs γc
exposure ζt − Kt
equilibrium price SKt
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holding costs γd
exposure Ut − Kt
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END-USERS
Figure 1: Interactions between dealers, clients, and end-users.
If the trades between dealers and clients are settled at a competitive price S = (St)t∈[0,T ] ∈H 2,
then supplying Kt shares of the risky asset at time t gives the dealers a P&L of
∫ T
0 −KtdSt.6
All the interactions between dealers, clients, and end-users are illustrated in Figure 1. Now,
we combine the dealers’ P&L from trading with the end-users (whose first component
∫ T
0 UtdVt
has expectation zero because V ∈ M 2 and U ∈ S 2) with the P&L from the client transactions,
add a running cost γd/2 for the dealers’ squared inventories, and value the terminal position at its
fundamental value. Together, this leads to the following linear-quadratic goal functional for the
dealers:
Jd(u,K;S) = E
[∫ T
0
(−Kt)dSt − (VT − ST )KT
]
− E
[∫ T
0
(
λ
2
u2t +
γd
2
(Ut −Kt)2
)
dt
]
. (2.1)
Here, we focus on admissible controls (u,K) ∈ L 2 ×S 2; for these, we have U = ∫ ·0 usds ∈ S 2 so
that the expectation in (2.1) is well-defined for any price process S ∈H 2 in the client market.
Remark 2.1. (i) For constant asset volatilities, the goal functional (2.1) can be interpreted as
a mean-variance tradeoff over wealth changes as in [20, 25, 15]. In general, the reduced-form
holding cost in (2.1) is more tractable than models with risk aversion. Similar criteria are
used in [30, 26, 28], for example.
(ii) We assume for simplicity that the risky asset is valued at its fundamental value at the terminal
time T . This could be replaced by a quadratic liquidation cost or avoided altogether by
postponing the planning horizon to infinity under suitable transversality conditions.
6This means that as in [14], the dealers act as price takers. This is natural if they are viewed as a continuum of
infinitesimally small agents. Then, the individual actions of each of them will not alter the aggregate supply. Thus,
offering more favorable prices to clients would only reduce individual profits. Conversely, no clients would be willing
to trade at less favorable than market prices.
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2.2 Optimal Trading in the End-User Market
For any given supply K ∈ S 2 to the client market, the dealers’ optimal transfer rate u to the
end-user market only affects the second expectation in (2.1). It thus amounts to the solution of a
tracking problem:
E
[∫ T
0
(
λ
2
u2t +
γd
2
(Ut −Kt)2
)
dt
]
→ min
u∈L 2
! (2.2)
Due to its quadratic structure, this problem has the following explicit solution [3]:
Lemma 2.2. Given K ∈ S 2, the dealers’ transfer rate uK ∈ L 2 to the end-user market that
minimizes (2.2) solves the (random) linear ODE
uKt :=
d
dt
UKt = Kt − F∆(t)UKt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, with UK0 = 0. (2.3)
Here,
F∆(t) =
√
∆ tanh(
√
∆(T − t)), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, for ∆ = γd
λ
,
and K is a weighted average of the expected future supply:
Kt = Et
[∫ T
t
D∆(t, s)Ksds
]
with D∆(t, s) =
∆ cosh(
√
∆(T − s))
cosh(
√
∆(T − t)) . (2.4)
In explicit form, the dealers’ optimal position in the end-user market is
UKt =
∫ t
0
e−
∫ t
s F
∆(r)drKsds =
1
∆
∫ t
0
D∆(s, t)Ksds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.5)
and the optimal transfer rate balances the expected future net position, in that
λuKt = −γdE
[∫ T
t
(UKs −Ks)ds
∣∣∣∣Ft] , 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.6)
Proof. The optimal uK is computed in [3, Theorem 3.1] and presented here with slightly different
notation. Identity (2.6) is the first-order condition for the optimality of uK , cf. [3, Lemma 5.2].
Remark 2.3. As observed in [3], (2.3) determines the dealers’ optimal transfer rate uKt at time
0 ≤ t ≤ T by how far their current cumulative transfers UKt deviate from a weighted average of
expected future demand:
K̂t :=
Kt
F∆(t)
= Et
[∫ T
t
√
∆ cosh(
√
∆(T − s))
sinh(
√
∆(T − t)) Ksds
]
.
The function F∆(t) describes the urgency with which the dealers seek to reduce their displacement
UKt − Kˆt from the target Kˆ. In particular, if K is constant then Kˆ ≡ K and the dealers’ inventory
UKt −K decreases at the exponential rate F∆(t).
In view of Lemma 2.2, the dealers’ goal functional (2.1) can be rewritten as a functional only
depending on their supply choice K ∈ S2:
Jd(K;S) = E
[∫ T
0
(
(−Kt)dSt − λ
2
(uKt )
2dt− γd
2
(UKt −Kt)2dt
)
− (VT − ST )KT
]
(2.7)
with uK and UK as in (2.3).
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2.3 Equilibrium Price in the Client Market
Our goal now is to determine the competitive equilibrium price at which the dealers’ optimal supply
K matches a given demand K in the client market:
Definition 2.4. For a given client demand K ∈ S 2, S ∈ H 2 is called equilibrium price, if the
dealers’ optimal supply matches the clients’ demand:
K ∈ arg max
K∈S 2
Jd(K;S).
Our first main result shows that a unique equilibrium price exists. It adjusts the fundamental
value of the risky asset by the dealers’ expected future inventories, weighted by their holding costs:7
Theorem 2.5. For a given client demand K ∈ S 2, the unique equilibrium price is
SKt = Vt − γdEt
[∫ T
t
(
UKs −Ks
)
ds
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.8)
Here, UK is given by (2.5) for K = K.
Proof. Observe that, for any S ∈ H 2, the functional (u,K) 7→ Jd(u,K;S) of (2.1) is concave on
L 2 ×S 2. Hence, the functional K 7→ Jd(K;S) = supu∈L 2 Jd(u,K;S) is concave on S 2. As it is
quadratic in K, this goal functional is furthermore Gaˆteaux differentiable in any direction L ∈ S 2.
For S to be an equilibrium price, it is thus necessary and sufficient that at K = K all directional
derivatives of K 7→ Jd(K;S) vanish:
0 = lim
ε→0
1
ε
(Jd(K + εL;S)− Jd(K;S))
=− E
[∫ T
0
(
λuKt + γd
∫ T
t
(UKs −Ks)ds
)
uLt dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
(−LtdSt + γd(UKt −Kt)Ltdt)− (VT − ST )LT] .
Now, note that the first expectation on the right-hand side vanishes by (2.6). Next, specialize to
simple processes L = `1]t,T ], where ` is an Ft-measurable, square-integrable random variable, to
rewrite the above condition as
0 = E
[
`
(
St + γd
∫ T
t
(Û K̂s − K̂s)ds− VT
)]
.
As ` ∈ L2(Ω,Ft, P ) is arbitrary and the fundamental value V ∈H 2 is a martingale, it follows from
definition of the conditional expectation and the preceding relation that the unique equilibrium
price S is
St = Vt − γdEt
[∫ T
t
(
U K̂s − K̂s
)
ds
]
,
exactly as asserted in (2.8) since K = K̂.
7An analogous result obtains in the small risk-aversion limit for the model of [14] studied by [21] – for small risk
aversion, their exponential utility is equivalent to the mean-inventory goal functional we consider here. The advantage
of the present approach is that the much more tractable linear-quadratic setting readily allows us to incorporate the
dealers’ hedging trades in the end-user market and, in addition, to endogenize the clients’ demand; see Section 3.
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In view of the first-order condition for the dealers’ optimal trading rate in the end-user mar-
ket (2.6), the equilibrium price from Theorem 2.5 admits the following concise representation:
SKt = Vt + λu
K
t . (2.9)
This means that the adjustment of the equilibrium price compared to the fundamental value is
the product of the trading cost in the end-user market, and the dealers’ current trading rate in
this market. To wit, suppose the dealers are selling to the end-users (uKt > 0) because they have
already accumulated a positive net position. Then they will only be willing to purchase further
risky assets from clients at a premium, but will conversely be willing to sell at a discount – exactly
as mandated by (2.9).
Despite this appealingly simple interpretation, the dependence of the equilibrium price (2.8)
on the model parameters is generally rather involved. Indeed, it typically depends on the past,
present, and future client demands, cf. Lemma 2.2. In particular, it exhibits resilience in that it
reverts towards the fundamental price V when K remains constant; cf. Remark 2.3.
2.4 Large-Liquidity Asymptotics
In order to better understand how equilibrium prices depend on the clients’ demand, we now
discuss the properties of the equilibrium price from Theorem 2.5 in the case of highly liquid end-
user markets (λ ≈ 0). For better readability, the proofs are delegated to Appendix A.
Our first result shows that the equilibrium price approaches the fundamental value as the end-
user market becomes more and more liquid for λ→ 0:
Proposition 2.6. For any demand K ∈ S2, the equilibrium price SK from Theorem 2.5 converges
to the fundamental price V in the particularly strong sense that
sup
−1≤H≤1 predictable
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
Hsd(Vs − SKs )
∣∣∣∣2
]
→ 0, as λ→ 0.
In particular SK converges to V in the Emery topology as λ → 0 and the corresponding wealth
processes generated by the clients’ demand satisfy∫ T
0
KtdSKt =
∫ T
0
KtdVt + o(1), in L1 as λ→ 0.
Proposition 2.6 asserts that, as the end-user market becomes more and more liquid, the dealer
price approaches the fundamental value of the risky asset. Given additional structure of the client
demand, we can also identify the leading-order correction term for the client’s wealth process, i.e.,
the liquidity costs implied by the dealers’ nontrivial but finite risk-bearing capacity. The form of
this leading-order correction term depends on the variability of the clients’ demand. To illustrate
this, we discuss the two examples that appear most frequently in applications: smooth demands
Kt =
∫ t
0 µ
K
s ds and diffusive demands with Itoˆ dynamics Kt =
∫ t
0 µ
K
s ds+
∫ t
0 σ
K
s dWs.
8
8For simplicity, we focus here on the case of a fixed client demand that does not vary with the liquidity parameter
λ. The more involved case where the client optimizes given the equilibrium pricing rule is subsequently treated in
Section 3.
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Smooth Demands We first discuss demands that accumulate at a finite, absolutely continuous
rate. In this case, the dealers could hedge their exposure perfectly by passing on their positions
immediately to the end-users subject to the quadratic cost λ/2 imposed on the corresponding
trading rate. Therefore, the dealers could break even using this strategy for an execution price
equal to the fundamental value plus the trading cost in the end-user market. However, due to
the quadratic nature of the trading cost, they could achieve strictly positive profits in this case by
absorbing only a fraction of the clients’ demands, so that the market would not clear at this price.
Accordingly, in equilibrium, the dealers need to be paid an additional premium.
The subsequent result identifies the leading-order term of this liquidity cost as twice the trading
cost in the end-user market. This term is independent of the dealers’ inventory costs, since smooth
client demands can be hedged very efficiently by trading in the end-user market.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that Kt =
∫ t
0 µ
K
s ds for a continuous process µ
K ∈ S 2. Then, the liquidity
costs generated by K are∫ T
0
KtdVt −
∫ T
0
KtdSKt = λ
∫ T
0
(
µKt
)2
dt+ o(λ), in L1 as λ→ 0. (2.10)
Diffusive demands Next, we turn to trading strategies with nontrivial Brownian fluctuations.
These could not be implemented directly in the end-user market, but can be traded at a finite cost
through the dealers. Since the dealers can hedge these more irregular order flows less efficiently
than the smooth flows considered above, the corresponding trading costs are of a higher asymptotic
order, namely O(
√
λ) instead of O(λ) as λ→ 0. Moreover, the dealers’ inventory cost now becomes
visible in the leading-order term. The asymptotically crucial feature of client demand turns out to
be its quadratic variation, which is a sufficient statistic for highly liquid end-user markets:
Lemma 2.8. Suppose that the underlying filtration is generated by a Brownian motion W and
assume that the client demand has Itoˆ dynamics,
Kt =
∫ t
0
µKs ds+
∫ t
0
σKs dWs, t ∈ [0, T ].
Here, |K|2, |µK|2, |σK|2 ∈ H 2 and these processes are Malliavin differentiable in the sense of [27,
p. 27]): K, µKt , σKt ∈ D1,2, with continuous Malliavin derivatives s 7→
(
Dt (Ks) , Dt
(
µKs
)
, Dt
(
σKs
))
,
0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T . Finally, suppose that sup0≤t≤T E[supt≤s≤T (|(Dt(Ks))|2 + |(Dt(µKs ))|2)] <∞. Then,
the liquidity costs generated by the demand K are∫ T
0
KtdVt −
∫ T
0
KtdSKt =
√
λγd
∫ T
0
(σKt )
2dt+ o(
√
λ), in L1 as λ→ 0.
Remark 2.9. The regularity conditions of Proposition 2.8 are satisfied, in particular, if the demand
K is the solution of a scalar stochastic differential equation whose drift and diffusion coefficients
are twice continuously differentiable with bounded derivatives of orders 0, 1, 2. In this case, the
required bounds for the Malliavin derivatives follow from [27, Theorem 2.2.1].
3 The Clients’ Problem
So far, the client demand was assumed to be given exogenously as in [18, 14, 17, 22]. We now
consider how to endogenize this demand for clients that behave optimally. To this end, we first
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specify the clients’ optimization problem for a given price process (SK˜t )t∈[0,T ] of the form (2.8) for
some demand K˜. The clients then compute their optimal demand K̂. Finally, the competitive
equilibrium price is determined by the consistency condition K˜ = K̂, which ensures that the equi-
librium pricing rule indeed corresponds to the clients’ aggregate demand. As for the dealers in
Section 2, this notion of competitive equilibrium assumes that the “clients” aggregate a continuum
of infinitesimal agents. Each of these then indeed acts as a price taker, since individual decisions
are negligible for the dealers’ pricing rule (2.8), which only reflects the aggregate demand.
To carry out this program, we first formulate the clients’ optimization problem. As in [24, 31, 12],
we assume that they track an exogenous trading target ζ = (ζt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ S 2.9 For a fixed execution
price (SK˜t )t∈[0,T ], holding Kt shares of the risky asset at time t gives the clients the standard overall
P&L
∫ T
0 KtdSK˜t . The corresponding local mean-variance goal functional for a running displacement
cost γc > 0 in turn reads as follows:
10
Jc(K;SK˜) = E
[∫ T
0
(
KtdSK˜t −
γc
2
(Kt − ζt)2dt
)]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
Ktγd(U K˜t − K˜t)−
γc
2
(Kt − ζt)2
)
dt
]
. (3.1)
Pointwise maximization of the integrand directly gives
K̂t = ζt + γd
γc
(U K˜t − K˜t). (3.2)
This pins down the clients’ optimal demand K̂ ∈ S 2, taking the price SK˜ as given. The consistency
condition K˜ = K̂ in turn requires that
K̂t = γd
γd + γc
U K̂t +
γc
γd + γc
ζt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.3)
In view of the representation of the optimal transfers to the end-user market from Lemma 2.2,
U K̂t =
1
∆
∫ t
0
D∆(s, t)K̂sds with K̂t = Et
[∫ T
t
D∆(t, v)K̂vdv
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.4)
we observe that (3.3) is an integral equation for K̂. It can be reformulated as a linear FBSDE, and
in turn solved explicitly:
Proposition 3.1. The clients’ optimal demand for (3.1) is the unique solution K̂ ∈ S 2 to (3.3)–
(3.4), given by
K̂t = γc
γd + γc
ζt + U˜
γd
γd+γc
ζ
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.5)
Here, U˜
γd
γd+γc
ζ
is the minimizer of (2.2) for K = γdγd+γc ζ and for γ˜ = (γ
−1
d + γ
−1
c )
−1 instead of γd:
U˜
γd
γd+γc
ζ
t =
1
∆˜
∫ t
0
D∆˜(s, t)
γd
γd + γc
ζ˜s ds,
9A diffusive trading target corresponds to the “high-frequency trading needs” studied in [24]. A constant target
ζ ≡ const. resembles the optimal execution problems studied by [5, 1, 29] and many more recent studies.
10For the second step, the drift rate of the execution price (2.8) is inserted. The expectation of the corresponding
stochastic integral vanishes because the martingale part of the execution price is square integrable and the clients’
demand belongs to S 2.
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where ∆˜ = γ˜/λ and
ζ˜t = E
[∫ T
t
D∆˜(t, s)ζsds
∣∣∣∣Ft] with D∆˜(t, s) = ∆˜ cosh(
√
∆˜(T − s))
cosh(
√
∆˜(T − t))
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Hence, the clients’ share γc/(γd + γc) of the total holding costs determines the fraction of the
exogenous risk ζ that they directly pass on to the dealers, taking advantage of the immediacy
the dealers provide. The clients transfer the remaining fraction γd/(γd + γc) gradually to the
dealers according to U˜
γd
γd+γc
ζ
. This resembles how the dealers in turn pass on their exposure to the
end-users, except that, trading through their dealers, the clients can draw on both their own as
well as their dealers’ inventory capacities so that the relevant holding costs parameter for them is
1/γ˜ = 1/γd + 1/γc rather than 1/γd.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. (i) For uniqueness in the integral equation (3.3), observe that the dif-
ference δ ∈ S 2 of any two solutions solves δ = γdγd+γcU δ. Recalling the definition of U δ
from (2.5), we thus can estimate
E
[
sup0≤t≤T |δt|
] ≤ sup
0≤t≤T
{
γd
γd + γc
∫ t
0
D∆(s, t)
∫ T
s
D∆(v, s)E [|δv|] dv ds
}
≤ E [sup0≤t≤T |δt|] γdγd + γc sup0≤t≤T
{∫ t
0
D∆(s, t)
∫ T
s
D∆(v, s)dv ds
}
= E
[
sup0≤t≤T |δt|
] γd
γd + γc
sup
0≤t≤T
{
1− cosh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆T )
}
≤ E [sup0≤t≤T |δt|] γdγd + γc .
Since γdγd+γc < 1, this implies E[sup0≤t≤T |δt|] = 0, establishing uniqueness.
(ii) Let us next argue that (3.3) is equivalent to a linear FBSDE. We start by deriving the FBSDE.
For the forward component, let
kt := K̂t − γc
γd + γc
ζt, 0 ≤ t < T, (3.6)
and observe that (3.3) yields k0 = 0 and
dkt =
γd
γd + γc
dU K̂t =
γd
γd + γc
(
K̂t − F∆(t)U K̂t
)
dt =
(
γd
γd + γc
K̂t − F∆(t)kt
)
dt.
Here, we first used (2.3) and then (3.3) together with (3.6).
The backward component emerges from the observation that for any K̂ ∈ S 2 the correspond-
ing K̂ of (2.4) is the unique solution κ in H 2 of the linear BSDE
dκt =
(
F∆(t)κt −∆K̂t)
)
dt+ dMκt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, κT = 0,
where Mκ ∈M 2 is a suitable square-integrable martingale uniquely determined by the BSDE.
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In summary, the integral equation(3.3) therefore leads to the following linear FBSDE for the
processes k = K̂ − γcγd+γc ζ and κ = K̂:
k0 = 0, dkt =
(
γd
γd + γc
κt − F∆(t)kt
)
dt, (3.7)
dκt =
(
F∆(t)κt −∆
(
kt +
γc
γd + γc
ζt
))
dt+ dMκt , κT = 0. (3.8)
Backtracking these steps, we also see that a solution (k, κ,Mκ) to this BSDE yields via (3.6)
a solution K̂ of (3.3).
(iii) To verify that (3.5) indeed is the solution of our integral equation (3.3), observe that the
corresponding
kt := K̂t − γc
γd + γc
ζt =
γd
γd + γc
1
∆˜
∫ t
0
D∆˜(s, t)ζ˜sds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
satisfies k0 = 0 and
dkt
dt
=
γd
γd + γc
ζ˜t − F ∆˜(t)kt.
With
κ˜t := ζ˜t +
γd + γc
γd
(F∆(t)− F ∆˜(t))kt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
this can be written as
dkt
dt
=
γd
γd + γc
κ˜t − F∆(t)kt. (3.9)
By comparison with (3.7), it thus remains to show that the above κ˜ is actually the solution
κ of the backward equation (3.8). Clearly, κ˜T = 0 since, by definition, ζ˜T = 0 and F
∆(T ) =
F ∆˜(T ) = 0. So we only need to determine the dt-component of κ˜’s dynamics. Observe that
dζ˜t = (F
∆˜ζ˜ − ∆˜ζ)dt+ dM ζ˜ , d(F∆ − F ∆˜) = {(F∆)2 − (F ∆˜)2 − (∆− ∆˜)}dt
for some martingale M ζ˜ ∈ M 2. Also using (3.9), we can in turn readily compute the dt-
component of dκ˜t as
F ∆˜ζ˜ − ∆˜ζ + γd + γc
γd
(
(F∆)2 − (F ∆˜)2 − (∆− ∆˜)
)
k +
γd + γc
γd
(F∆ − F ∆˜)
(
γd
γd + γc
κ˜− F∆k
)
= F ∆˜ζ˜ − ∆˜ζ + F∆κ˜− F ∆˜κ˜+ γd + γc
γd
(
(F∆)2 − (F ∆˜)2 − (∆− ∆˜)− (F∆ − F ∆˜)F∆
)
k
= F∆κ˜− ∆˜ζ + F ∆˜
(
ζ˜ +
γd + γc
γd
(F∆ − F ∆˜)k − κ˜
)
− γd + γc
γd
(∆− ∆˜)k
= F∆κ˜−∆
(
k +
γc
γd + γc
ζ
)
.
where the last identity holds by definition of κ˜ and ∆˜ = γcγd+γc∆. This completes the proof.
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To illustrate the implications of this result, we now consider two examples: optimal execution
as in [5, 1, 29] and diffusive trading targets as in [24, 31, 12]. In both cases we will compare the
clients’ situation when trading through the dealers with the one when they directly trade with
end-users seeking to maximize
Jdirectc (u) = E
[∫ T
0
UsdVs − λ
2
∫ T
0
u2sds−
γc
2
∫ T
0
(Us − ζs)2ds
]
= −E
[
λ
2
∫ T
0
u2sds+
γc
2
∫ T
0
(Us − ζs)2ds
]
→ max!u∈L 2,U=∫ .0 usds
Example 3.2 (Optimal Liquidation). We first consider the simplest example where the clients’
target is a constant position, ζt ≡ ζ ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ].11 In this case, an elementary integration
shows that ζ˜t = F
∆˜(t)ζ. Thus, (3.5) and another elementary integration imply that the liquidating
clients’ optimal demand is
K̂t = γc
γd + γc
ζ +
γd
γd + γc
ζ
(
1− cosh(
√
∆˜(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆˜T )
)
. (3.10)
This means that the clients use a bulk trade at time t = 0 to sell a fraction of their trading target
equal to their share of the total holding costs. Subsequently, they continue selling at an absolutely
continuous rate.
Let us now compare this optimal execution path to the one that would obtain if the clients
could trade directly in the end-user market:12
K̂directt =
(
1− cosh(
√
∆direct(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆directT )
)
ζ, ∆direct =
γc
λ
.
In this case, the optimal execution path is evidently smooth, since bulk trades have an infinite cost
in the end-user market. Accordingly, optimal liquidation is initially faster in the dealer market
(that can absorb an initial bulk trade), but depending on the model parameters, the total number
of shares sold directly can (but does not have to) eventually surpass the number of shares sold
through the dealers. This is illustrated in Figure 2 for γd = γc = 1, λ = 1, ζ = −1 and T = 1 (left
panel) and T = 5 (right panel).
This raises the question whether it is more efficient for the clients to trade through the dealers or
directly in the end-user market. To compare the clients’ performance in the two different markets,
we compute the optimal value of their goal functional in each case. When trading directly in the
end-user market, it follows from [3, Theorem 3.1] that
max Jdirectc = −
√
γcλ
2
tanh
(√
γc
λ
T
)
ζ2 = −
√
γc
2
√
λζ2 + o(
√
λ), as λ→ 0.
When trading through the intermediating dealers, the first-order condition (3.2) and (3.10) show
11Complete liquidation as in [5, 1, 29] could be promoted using a quadratic liquidation penalty as in [10, 4] or
enforced by a hard terminal constraint as in [3]. To ease notation, we do not pursue this here.
12See [10, 3] or Equation (2.5) in Lemma 2.2 with Kt = ζ, γd = γc, and St = Vt so that Kt = F (t)ζ.
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Figure 2: Optimal positions when trading through dealers (solid) or directly with end-users
(dashed), for shorter time horizon (left panel) and longer time horizon (right panel).
that the clients optimal performance in (3.1) is
Jc(K̂) = γc
2
∫ T
0
(K̂2t − ζ2)dt
=
γcζ
2
2
∫ T
0
(
γ2d
(γd + γc)2
cosh(
√
∆˜(T − t))2
cosh(
√
∆˜T )2
− 2γd
γd + γc
cosh(
√
∆˜(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆˜T )
)
dt
=
γcζ
2
2
(
γ2d
(γd + γc)2
(
T
2 cosh(
√
∆˜T )2
+
tanh(
√
∆˜T )
2
√
∆˜
)
− 2γd
γd + γc
tanh(
√
∆˜T )√
∆˜
)
= −
√
γdγc(3γd + 4γc)
4(γd + γc)3/2
√
λζ2 + o(
√
λ).
We see that for a highly liquid end-user market (λ ≈ 0) the liquidity costs are of the same asymptotic
order O(
√
λ) in both markets. Indeed, the leading-order optimal performances in both markets are
the same up to replacing
√
γc (for direct trading in the highly liquid end-user market) with
√
γdγc(3γd + 4γc)
4(γd + γc)3/2
=
3 + 4γc/γd
4(1 + γc/γd)3/2
√
γc (3.11)
when trading through the dealers. In the large-liquidity limit, the relative performance in both
markets therefore only depends on the ratio of the clients’ and dealers’ inventory costs. A short
calculation shows that the dealer market becomes strictly more attractive if γc/γd is larger.
This means that the dealer market is preferable to direct trading if the dealers’ risk-bearing
capacity is sufficiently large compared to the clients’. The universal cutoff point is γc/γd ≈ 2.44.
Example 3.3 (Diffusive Trading Targets). To explore the other end of the spectrum of potential
target strategies, suppose as in [24, 31, 12] that the (aggregate) clients have a “high-frequency
trading need” modeled by a target position ζ following Brownian motion with volatility σζ . For
such a martingale ζ, we also have ζ˜t = F
∆˜(t)ζt. Together with ζ0 = 0 it in turn follows from
Formula (3.9) in the proof of Proposition 3.1 that the clients’ optimal position has the following
dynamics:
dK̂t = F ∆˜(t)(ζt − K̂t)dt+ γc
γd + γc
dζt.
As a consequence, the deviation ζt − K̂t from the target position has Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type
dynamics,
d(ζt − K̂t) = −F ∆˜(t)(ζt − K̂t)dt+ γd
γd + γc
dζt, ζ0 − K̂0 = 0.
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Figure 3: Optimal tracking strategies for a diffusive target (blue), when trading through dealers
(orange, left panel) or directly with end-users (orange, right panel).
The displacement from the target position therefore mean reverts around zero. The corresponding
mean reversion speed is given by the function F ∆˜(t) =
√
∆˜ tanh(
√
∆˜(T − t)), which interpolates
between stopping trading at the terminal time and the long-run relative trading speed
√
∆˜ =√
γdγc
λ(γd+γc)
=
√
γ˜/λ. The latter also arises as the leading order term in the small-cost expansion of
F ∆˜(t) (that is, as λ ≈ 0).
Let us now again compare the equilibrium with intermediaries to a model where the clients
trade directly in the end-user market as in [3]. Then, their optimal trading rate is smooth:
dK̂directt = F∆direct(t)(ζt − K̂directt )dt.
However, even though the optimal position is now smooth, the corresponding displacement from
the target position again has Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-type dynamics:
d(ζ − K̂directt ) = −F∆direct(t)(ζt − K̂directt )dt+ dζt, ζ0 − K̂direct0 = 0.
The relative trading speed now is F∆direct(t) =
√
∆direct tanh(
√
∆direct(T − t)) which approximately
equals
√
∆direct =
√
γc
λ for a long time horizon T or small trading costs λ. Compared to trading
through the dealers, we see that this trading speed is larger, but also that the Brownian shocks
in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck dynamics are larger because they cannot be hedged by trading in an
absolutely continuous manner. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
When trading directly in the end-user market, [3, Theorem 3.1] as well as an elementary inte-
gration and Taylor expansion show that the clients’ optimal performance is
max Jdirectc = −γcσ2ζ
log(cosh(
√
∆directT ))
∆direct
= −
√
γc
2
√
λσ2ζT + o(
√
λ) as λ→ 0.
When trading through the intermediating dealers, the first-order condition (3.2) and integration of
the hyperbolic functions in (3.5) shows that the clients’ optimal performance in (3.1) is13
Jc(K̂) = γc
2
E
[∫ T
0
(K̂2t − ζ2t )dt
]
= −σ
2
ζ
∆˜
γdγc
γd + γc
(
log
(
cosh(
√
∆˜T )
)
− 1
4
γd
γd + γc
√
∆˜T tanh(
√
∆˜T )
)
= −
√
γdγc(3γd + 4γc)
4(γd + γc)3/2
√
λσ2ζT + o(
√
λ) as λ→ 0.
13Note that this term is always negative since the function x 7→ log(cosh(x))− 1
4
x tanh(x) is positive.
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Whence, exactly as in Example 3.2, the leading-order optimal performances in both markets are
the same up to replacing
√
γc (for direct trading in the highly liquid end-user market) with the
term from (3.11). Thus, the dealer market is again preferable to direct trading if the dealers’ risk-
bearing capacity is sufficiently large compared to the clients. For highly-liquid end-user markets,
the corresponding cutoff also remains invariant.
4 Large Clients
In Section 3 we have considered a continuum of infinitesimal clients, each acting as a price taker.
We now turn to a single large client, who internalizes the price impact of his trades. The analogue
of the goal functional (3.1) in turn is
J˜c(K) = E
[∫ T
0
(
KtdSKt −
γc
2
(Kt − ζt)2dt
)]
= E
[∫ T
0
(
Ktγd(UKt −Kt)−
γc
2
(Kt − ζt)2
)
dt
]
.
Since the large trader takes into account how his demand K affects the execution price SK from
Theorem 2.5, the new criterion J˜c can no longer be optimized by pointwise maximization as was
still possible for Jc of (3.1). The new target functional is, however, still concave:
Lemma 4.1. The bilinear form
B : S2 × S2 → R
(L,K) 7→ −E
[∫ T
0
LtdSKt
]
is symmetric and positive definite. In particular, the induced quadratic form K 7→ B(K,K) is convex
and J˜c is concave.
Remark 4.2. Note that B(K,K) ≥ 0 describes the dealers’ expected profits and, accordingly,
−B(K,K) ≤ 0 the large client’s expected costs. The equilibrium price impact functional K 7→ SK
therefore does not allow for price manipulation strategies as discussed for reduced form price impact
models in [16].
Proof. Observe that
B(L,K) = −E
[∫ T
0
LtdSKt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
Ltγd(Kt − UKt )dt
]
.
Whence, for symmetry it suffices to verify
E
[∫ T
0
KtULt dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
LtUKt dt
]
, for all K,L ∈ S 2.
By (2.5) and (2.4), we have
E
[∫ T
0
KtULt dt
]
=
1
∆
E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
1{s≤t}1{s≤r}D∆(s, t)D∆(s, r)KtEs[Lr]drdsdt
]
. (4.1)
Now notice that the tower property of the conditional expectation implies that
E
[
KtEs[Lr]
]
= E
[
LrEs[Kt]
]
, on {0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T} ∩ {0 ≤ s ≤ r ≤ T}.
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Together with Fubini’s theorem, it follows that (4.1) can indeed be rewritten as
E
[∫ T
0
KtULt dt
]
=
1
∆
E
[∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
1{s≤t}1{s≤r}D∆(s, t)D∆(s, r)LrEs[Kt]dtdsdr
]
=
1
∆
E
[∫ T
0
(
Lr
∫ r
0
(
D∆(s, r)Es
[∫ T
s
D∆(s, t)Ktdt
])
ds
)
dr
]
= E
[∫ T
0
LrUKr dr
]
.
Here, we have again used (2.4) and (2.5) for the least equality.
As for the positive definiteness of B, recall that at equilibrium prices SK the dealers’ optimal
supply is K̂ = K. So, in particular,
0 = Jd(0;S
K) ≤ Jd(K;SK) = B(K,K)− 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
λ(uKt )
2 + γd(U
K
t −Kt)2 dt
]
where we used (2.7) and (2.8). Since the latter expectation is nonnegative, this proves B(K,K) ≥ 0
as claimed.
Due to the concavity of J˜c, we can optimize it the same way as for the dealers’ problem in the
proof of Theorem 2.5. To wit, the necessary and sufficient first-order condition for optimality is
that its Gaˆteaux derivative vanishes at the optimum K˜ in any direction L ∈ S 2:
0 =
d
d
J˜c(K˜ + L)
∣∣∣∣
=0
=
d
d
(
−B(K˜ + L, K˜ + L)− γc
2
E
[∫ T
0
(K˜t + Lt − ζt)2dt
)]∣∣∣∣
=0
= −2B(L, K˜)− γcE
[∫ T
0
(K˜t − ζt)Ltdt
]
,
where we used the symmetry of B. In view of −B(L,K) = E
[∫ T
0 Ltγd(UKt −Kt)dt
]
, this is
tantamount to
0 = E
[∫ T
0
Lt
(
2γdU
K˜
t − (2γd + γc)K˜t + γcζt
)
dt
]
.
As this condition has to hold for any perturbation L ∈ S 2, it is equivalent to
K˜t = γd
γd + γc/2
U K˜t +
γc/2
γd + γc/2
ζt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Remarkably, this is almost exactly the same integral equation as its counterpart (3.3) for a contin-
uum of small clients – the only difference is that the large client’s holding costs are halved here. In
particular, existence, uniqueness, and explicit formulas for the large client’s optimal trading strat-
egy follow from Proposition 3.1. The structure of the equilibrium therefore remains unchanged.
The only quantitative difference is that, since large clients internalize their price impact, they weigh
transaction costs more heavily compared to displacement from their trading targets, and therefore
trade more slowly.
The price impact is correctly internalized in the large client’s optimization problem J˜c unlike
for its counterpart Jc for the price-taking clients. Accordingly, the optimal performance of the large
client is always at least as good as for the aggregation of small (decentralized) clients:
J˜c(K˜) ≥ J˜c(K̂) = Jc(K̂).
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Figure 4: Ratio of optimal performances for large client and aggregation of small clients.
The magnitude of this “price of anarchy” [8] can be analyzed by computing the large client’s optimal
performance exactly as for the small clients in Examples 3.2 and 3.3. For a highly liquid end-user
market (λ ≈ 0), the respective performances merely differ by a universal factor, which is a function
of the ratio γc/γd of the dealers’ and clients’ holding costs only:
4 + 2γc/γd
2(2 + γc/γd)3/2
/ 3 + 4γc/γd
4(1 + γc/γd)3/2
.
The ratio ρ of these terms is plotted against γc/γd in Figure 4. Since the clients’ performance is
negative, values smaller than one correspond to the better performance of the large client. Maybe
surprisingly, the maximal asymptotic performance gain by correctly internalizing the price impact
is only about 7%, independent of the other model parameters.
A Proofs for Section 2.4
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Write
Vt − SKt = Mt −At with At := γd
∫ t
0
(UKs −Ks)ds, Mt := Et[AT ], 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Then, for any predictable H with values in [−1, 1], Doob’s maximal inequality, the Itoˆ isometry,
and Jensen’s inequality show that
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
Hsd(Vs − SKs )
∣∣∣∣2
]
≤ 2
(
E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
HsdMs
∣∣∣∣2
]
+ E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
HsdAs
∣∣∣∣2
])
≤ 2
(
4E
[∫ T
0
H2t d〈M〉t
]
+ E
[(∫ T
0
|H|tγd|UKt −Kt|dt
)2])
≤ 2
(
4E[M2T ] + Tγ
2
d E
[∫ T
0
(UKt −Kt)2dt
])
≤ 10Tγ2d E
[∫ T
0
(UKt −Kt)2dt
]
. (A.1)
Since {U = ∫ .0 usds : u ∈ L 2} is dense in L 2, there exists a sequence un ∈ L 2 such that
E
[∫ T
0
(∫ t
0
uns ds−Kt
)2
dt
]
≤ 1
n
, n = 1, 2, . . .
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Due to the minimality condition (2.2), we have
E
[∫ T
0
γd
2
(UKt −Kt)2dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
(
λ
2
(unt )
2 +
γd
2
(∫ t
0
uns ds−Kt
)2)
dt
]
≤ λ
2
E
[∫ T
0
(unt )
2dt
]
+
γd
2n
.
Thus, E[
∫ T
0 (U
K
t −Kt)2dt]→ 0 as λ→ 0. Together with (A.1), this establishes the first convergence
asserted in Proposition 2.6.
To also show convergence in L1, we apply the inequalities of Burkholder-Davis-Gundy and
Ho¨lder to obtain
E
[∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
Kt(dSKt − dVt)
∣∣∣∣] ≤ E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
KsdMs
∣∣∣∣
]
+ E
[
sup
0≤t≤T
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
KsdAs
∣∣∣∣
]
≤ CE
[(∫ T
0
K2sd〈M〉s
)1/2]
+ E
[∫ T
0
|Ks|γd|UKs −Ks|ds
]
≤ E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Ks|
(
C〈M〉1/2T +
∫ T
0
γd|UKs −Ks|ds
)]
≤ E
[
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Ks|2
]1/2
E
[
2(C2T + T )γd
∫ T
0
|UKs −Ks|2ds
]1/2
,
where C > 0 is the constant of the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality. L1 convergence now follows,
since we have already verified above that the last term converges to 0 as λ→ 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.7. By (2.8), (2.9), and integration by parts (using K0 = uKT = 0), we have∫ T
0
KtdVt −
∫ T
0
KtdSKt = λ
∫ T
0
KtduKt = λ
∫ T
0
µKt u
K
t dt. (A.2)
To establish (2.10), it therefore suffices to show that∫ T
0
|µKt − uKt |dt = o(1) in L1 as λ→ 0. (A.3)
To this end, first notice that (2.3), (2.5), and integration by parts give
µKt − uKt = µKt + F∆(t)UKt −Kt
= µKt − F∆(t)(Kt − UKt ) + F∆(t)Kt −
∆
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))Et
[∫ T
t
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))Ksds
]
= µKt − F∆(t)(Kt − UKt )−
√
∆
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))Et
[∫ T
t
sinh(
√
∆(T − s))µKs ds
]
. (A.4)
Now, note that √
∆
∫ T
t sinh(
√
∆(T − s))ds
cosh(
√
∆(T − t)) = 1−
1
cosh(
√
∆(T − t)) .
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Together with (A.4), it follows that K − UK satisfies the linear ODE
d(Kt − UKt )
dt
= µKt − uKt = −F∆(t)(Kt − UKt ) + w∆(t) +
µKt
cosh(
√
∆(T − t)) , (A.5)
where
w∆(t) = Et
[∫ T
t
√
∆ sinh(
√
∆(T − s))
cosh(
√
∆(T − t)) (µ
K
t − µKs )ds
]
.
Since K0 = UK0 = 0 and by definition of the function F∆ in Lemma 2.2, the explicit solution
of (A.5) is
Kt − UKt =
∫ t
0
e−
∫ t
s F
∆(u)du
(
w∆s +
µKs
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))
)
ds
=
∫ t
0
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))
(
w∆s +
µKs
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))
)
ds.
Together with (A.5), it follows that∫ T
0
|µKt − uKt |dt ≤ sup
u∈[0,T ]
|w∆u |
∫ T
0
(
1 +
√
∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))ds
)
dt
+ sup
u∈[0,T ]
|µKu |
∫ T
0
(
1
cosh(
√
∆(T − t)) +
√
∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh2(
√
∆(T − s))ds
)
dt
≤ sup
u∈[0,T ]
|w∆u |
∫ T
0
(
1 +
√
∆
∫ t
0
e−
√
∆(t−s)ds
)
dt
+ sup
u∈[0,T ]
|µKu |
(∫ T
0
2e−
√
∆tdt+
∫ T
0
√
∆
∫ T
s
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh2(
√
∆(T − s))dtds
)
≤ 2T sup
u∈[0,T ]
|w∆u |+
3√
∆
sup
u∈[0,T ]
|µKu |. (A.6)
Write
ω(δ) = sup
t,s∈[0,T ],|t−s|≤δ
∣∣∣µK(s)− µK(t)∣∣∣
for the modulus of continuity of µK. Since t 7→ µKt is continuous on the compact set [0, T ],
ω(δ)→ 0, a.s. as δ → 0. (A.7)
The definitions of w∆ and ω and a change of variables yield the following estimate:
0 ≤ |w∆(t)| ≤ 1
2
Et
[∫ T
t
√
∆e−
√
∆(s−t)ω(s− t)ds
]
≤ 1
2
Et
[∫ ∞
0
e−uω
(
u√
∆
)
du
]
:= M∆t . (A.8)
Here, (M∆t )t∈[0,T ] is a martingale for each ∆ > 0 since |ω(δ)| ≤ 2 sups∈[0,T ] |µKs | is integrable by
assumption. Also note that by definition of the modulus of continuity ω, the mapping ∆ 7→M∆t is
decreasing for each t. Define
M∗ := lim
∆→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
M∆t ≥ 0.
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Fix  > 0. Then, by the monotonicity in ∆, we have
P [M∗ ≥ ] ≤ lim
∆→∞
P
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
M∆t ≥ 
]
≤ lim
∆→∞
E[M∆T ]

= 0.
Here, the last equality is a consequence of (A.7), another application of the monotone convergence
theorem and the integrability of right-hand side in (A.8). As a result,
0 ≤ lim sup
∆→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|w∆(t)| ≤M∗ = 0 a.s.
In view of (A.6), it follows that the asserted convergence (A.3) holds in the almost-sure sense.
To show convergence in L1, it therefore suffices to establish uniform integrability of (A.2).
By (A.6) and (A.8),∫ T
0
|(µKt )2 − uKt µKt |dt ≤ sup
s∈[0,T ]
|µKs |
∫ T
0
|µKt − uKt |dt ≤ T sup
s∈[0,T ]
|w∆s |2 + (T +
3√
∆
) sup
s∈[0,T ]
|µKs |2
≤ T sup
s∈[0,T ]
|M∆s |2 + (T +
3√
∆
) sup
s∈[0,T ]
|µKs |2.
Observe that the right-hand side is decreasing in ∆, and integrable for, e.g., ∆ = 1 by Doob’s
maximal inequality:
E
[
T sup
t∈[0,T ]
|M1t |2 + (T + 3) sup
t∈[0,T ]
|µKt |2
]
≤ E
[
2T |M1T |2 + (T + 3) sup
t∈[0,T ]
|µKt |2
]
<∞.
Therefore, the family, {∫ T0 |(µKt )2 − utµKt |ds,∆ ≥ 1} is uniformly integrable. Since∫ T
0
|(µKt )2 − utµKt |ds ≤ sup
s∈[0,T ]
|µKs |
∫ T
0
|µKs − us|ds,
this implies that the almost sure convergence we have established for (A.3) also holds in L1.
Proof of Lemma 2.8. In view of 2.8, (2.9) as well as integration by parts (using that K0 = uKT = 0),
the liquidity costs of the clients can be written as∫ T
0
KtdVt −
∫ T
0
KtdSKt = −λ
∫ T
0
KtduKt = λ〈uK,K〉T + λ
∫ T
0
uKt (µ
K
t dt+ σ
K
t dWt). (A.9)
By (2.3), we have uKt = Kt−F∆(t)UKt , which implies that the covariation of uK is the same as the
one of K. Note that by definition (cf. (2.4)),
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))Kt −∆
∫ t
0
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))Ksds = ∆Et
[∫ T
0
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))Ksds
]
(A.10)
is a square-integrable martingale. By the martingale representation theorem, it therefore can be
written as a stochastic integral with respect to the Brownian motion generating the underlying
filtration. The integrand in this representation can be computed using the Clark-Ocone formula.
Indeed, setting
Φ = ∆
∫ T
0
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))Ksds
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and using the Malliavin differentiability of Φ that we prove below, the Clark-Ocone formula [27,
Proposition 1.3.14] yields
Φ = E [Φ] +
∫ T
0
Et [DtΦ] dWt.
By inserting this into (A.10) and integrating by parts, we in turn obtain
〈uK,K〉T =
∫ T
0
Et [DtΦ]
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))σ
K
t dt. (A.11)
We now show that we indeed have Φ ∈ D1,2, so that the Clark-Ocone formula can be applied.
Given our assumption on the square-integrability of the supremum of its Malliavin derivative,
K ∈ L1,2,f , cf. [27, p. 45]. Thus, by [27, p. 45], Φ is Malliavin differentiable and it follows from the
product rule that
DtΦ =
∫ T
t
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))DtKsds. (A.12)
We now expand DtΦ and Et[DtΦ] for λ → 0 or, equivalently, ∆ → ∞. First note that by (A.12)
and the definition of the hyperbolic cosine,
√
∆
−1
DtΦ
cosh(
√
∆(T − t)) =
√
∆
∫ T
t
e
√
∆(t−s) + e−
√
∆(2T−(s+t))
1 + e−2
√
∆(T−t) DtKsds. (A.13)
By continuity of s 7→ Dt(Ks) on [t, T ], some elementary integrations show that the above expression
converges to DtKt as ∆ → ∞. In view of [27, Proposition 1.3.8], we have Dt(
∫ t
0 σ
K
s dWs) = σ
K
t .
Moreover, Dt(
∫ t
0 µ
K
s ds) = 0, so that
√
∆
−1
DtΦ
cosh(
√
∆(T − t)) → σ
K
t , P -a.s. as ∆→∞.
Next, observe that for every t ∈ [0, T ], it follows from (A.13) that
sup
∆>1
∣∣∣∣∣
√
∆
−1
DtΦ
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ sups∈[t,T ] |DtKs|2 sup∆>1
{√
∆
∫ T
t
e
√
∆(t−s)ds
}
≤ 2 sup
t≤s≤T
|DtKs|. (A.14)
Since the right-hand side is integrable by assumption, the dominated convergence theorem in turn
shows
Et
[ √
∆
−1
DtΦ
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))
]
→ σKt , dP × dt-a.s. as ∆→∞.
We now show that this expansion of DtΦ is inherited by its conditional expectation and in turn
the covariation (A.11). To this end, we first use (A.14) and Young’s inequality to obtain that
sup
∆>1
|σKt |
∣∣∣∣∣Et
[ √
∆
−1
DtΦ
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 13 supt∈[0,T ] |σKt |3 + 23 sup∆>1
∣∣∣∣∣Et
[ √
∆
−1
DtΦ
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))
]∣∣∣∣∣
3/2
≤ 1
3
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|σKt |3 +
√
32
3
Et
[
sup
t≤s≤T
|DtKs|3/2
]
.
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Jensen’s inequality and the integrability assumption for the supremum of the Malliavin derivative
of K yield
E
[∫ T
0
Et
[
supt≤s≤T |DtKs|3/2
]4/3
dt
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
supt≤s≤T |DtKs|2dt
]
<∞.
Moreover, (supt∈[0,T ] |σKt |3)4/3 = supt∈[0,T ] |σKt |4 is also integrable by assumption. Together, these
two estimates show that
E
∫ T
0
(
sup
∆>1
|σKt |
∣∣∣∣∣Et
[ √
∆
−1
DtΦ
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))
]∣∣∣∣∣
)4/3
dt
 <∞. (A.15)
Since the term inside this expectation is finite, the dominated convergence theorem implies that,
as λ→ 0 and in turn ∆→∞,
√
∆
−1〈uK,K〉T =
∫ T
0
√
∆
−1
Et[DtΦ]
cosh(
√
∆(T − t))σ
K
t dt→
∫ T
0
(
σKt
)2
dt, P -a.s.
Finally, (A.15) also shows that the 4/3-th moment of
∫ T
0
√
∆
−1
Et[DtΦ]
cosh(
√
∆(T−t))σ
K
t dt is bounded, uniformly
for all ∆ > 1. Therefore, this family indexed by ∆ > 1 is uniformly integrable and the almost sure
convergence for ∆→∞ also holds in L1.
To complete the proof, we now show that the other terms in (A.9) do not contribute at the
leading order O(
√
λ), that is,
λ
∫ T
0
uKt (µ
K
t dt+ σ
K
t dWt) = o(
√
λ), in L1 as λ→ 0.
Since ∆ = γd/λ, this is implied by a bound for ∆
−1/2uK. To this end, observe that the inequalities
of Jensen and Burkholder-Davis-Gundy show
E
[
(Kt −Ks)4
] ≤ C (E [(∫ t
s
µKr dr
)4]
+ E
[(∫ t
s
σKr dWr
)4])
≤ C ′E
[
sup
t
|µKt |4 + |σKt |4
]
(t− s)2,
for some universal constants C,C ′ > 0. For α < 14 , write Rα for the modulus of α-Ho¨lder continuity
of K. This quantity is well defined and satisfies E[R4α] <∞ by [13, Theorem 3.1].14 Define
Mα := sup
s∈[0,T ]
Es[Rα]
(
1 +
∫ ∞
0
2e−u|u|αds
)
+ sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Ks| <∞.
14This theorem requires an additional assumption on the iterated integral of the process K. However, a careful
inspection of the proof reveals that this extra assumption is only needed to establish additional path regularity of
the iterated integral and not for the path regularity of the process K itself.
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Then, we can estimate∣∣∣∆−1/2Kt +Kt∣∣∣ ≤ Et [Rα ∫ T
t
∆−1/2D∆(t, s)|t− s|αds
]
+
∣∣∣∣1− ∫ T
t
∆−1/2D∆(t, s)ds
∣∣∣∣ |Kt|
≤ Et[Rα]∆(1−α)/2
∫ T
t
2e
√
∆(T−s)
e
√
∆(T−t) |
√
∆(t− s)|αds+
∣∣∣1− tanh(√∆(T − t))∣∣∣ |Kt|
≤ Et[Rα]∆−α/2
∫ ∞
0
2e−u|u|αds+ 2e−2
√
∆(T−t) |Kt|
≤
(
∆−α/2 + 2e−2
√
∆(T−t)
)
Mα := Ct,T,α,λ.
Together with the formulas for uK, UK and the definition of the function F∆ from Lemma 2.2, this
estimate yields∣∣∣∆−1/2uKt ∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣−∆−1/2F∆(t)UKt + ∆−1/2Kt∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣√∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))∆
−1/2Ksds+ ∆−1/2Kt
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣√∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))Ksds−Kt
∣∣∣∣∣+ Ct,T,α,λ +√∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))Cs,T,α,λds
≤
√
∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s)) (Rα|t− s|
α + Cs,T,α,λ) ds
+ Ct,T,α,λ +
∣∣∣∣∣1−√∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))ds
∣∣∣∣∣ |Kt|
≤ Ct,T,α,λ + ∆−α/2Rα
∫ ∞
0
e−u|u|αdu+
√
∆
∫ t
0
e−
√
∆(t−s)Cs,T,α,λds
+
∣∣∣∣∣1−√∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))ds
∣∣∣∣∣ |Kt| . (A.16)
Recall the addition formula arctan (x) − arctan (y) = arctan
(
x−y
1+xy
)
for x, y ≥ 0 and observe that
| arctan(x)| ≤ |x|. As a consequence:
√
∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))ds = sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
(
arctan
(
sinh(
√
∆T )
)
− arctan
(
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
))
= sinh(
√
∆(T − t)) arctan
(
sinh(
√
∆T )− sinh(√∆(T − t))
1 + sinh(
√
∆T ) sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
)
≤ sinh(
√
∆(T − t)) arctan
(
sinh(
√
∆T )
1 + sinh(
√
∆T ) sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
)
≤ sinh(
√
∆(T − t)) sinh(√∆T )
1 + sinh(
√
∆T ) sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
≤ 1,
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as well as
√
∆
∫ t
0
sinh(
√
∆(T − t))
cosh(
√
∆(T − s))ds =
√
∆
∫ t
0
e−
√
∆(t−s) − e−
√
∆(2T−s−t)
1 + e−2
√
∆(T−s) ds
≥
√
∆
∫ t
0
(
e−
√
∆(t−s) − e−
√
∆(2T−s−t)
)(
1− e−2
√
∆(T−s)
)
ds
≥
√
∆
∫ t
0
e−
√
∆(t−s) − e−
√
∆(2T−2t+(t−s)) − e−
√
∆(2T−2t+3(t−s))ds
≥ 1− e−
√
∆t − 2e−2
√
∆(T−t).
In view of these two estimates, (A.16) yields∣∣∣∆−1/2uKt ∣∣∣ ≤ Ct,T,α,λ + ∆−α/2Rα ∫ ∞
0
e−u|u|αdu+
√
∆
∫ t
0
e−
√
∆(t−s)Cs,T,α,λds
+
(
e−
√
∆t + 2e−2
√
∆(T−t)
)
sup
s∈[0,T ]
|Ks|
≤ 4
(
e−
√
∆t + ∆−α/2 + e−2
√
∆(T−t)
)
Mα. (A.17)
(Here, the last inequality follows from the definition of C·,T,α,λ.) In particular, there exists a
constant CT > 0 only depending on T such that∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
∆−1/2uKt µ
K
t dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ CTMα sup
t∈[0,T ]
|µKt |(∆−α/2 + ∆−1/2)
≤ CT
2
(
|Mα|2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|µKt |2
)
(∆−α/2 + ∆−1/2)→ 0,
as λ→ 0 and in turn ∆→∞. By the dominated convergence theorem, this pointwise convergence
also holds in L1, since the upper bound in this estimate is integrable under our assumptions. This
shows that the Lebesgue integral in (A.9) is indeed of order o(
√
λ) as claimed.
The argument for the stochastic integral in (A.9) is similar. By the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy
inequality, choosing CT > 0 larger if necessary, we obtain
E
[∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
∆−1/2uKt σ
K
t dWt
∣∣∣∣] ≤ CTE
[(∫ T
0
|∆−1/2uKt σKt |2dt
)1/2]
≤ 4CTE
[
|Mα| sup
t∈[0,T ]
|σKt |
(∫ T
0
e−
√
∆t + ∆−α/2 + e−2
√
∆(T−t)dt
)1/2]
≤ 2CT (∆−α/2 + ∆−1/2)1/2E
[
|Mα|2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|σKt |2
]
→ 0,
as λ→ 0 and in turn ∆→∞. Here, we have used (A.17) for the second inequality. Therefore, the
stochastic integral in (A.9) also is of order o(
√
λ) in L1, as λ→ 0 and the proof is complete.
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